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AbstrAct: The EU model of international judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, based on a high level of presumed mutual trust among Member 
States and on the principle of mutual recognition resulting therefrom, 
purports to go beyond traditional models of cooperation by enabling 
simplicity and speed on a ‘no questions asked’ approach.  The European 
Arrest Warrant is emblematic in this respect. Nonetheless, the opera-
tion of this tool has not been a straightforward or uncomplicated task, 
in particular from the point of view of the interplay between mutual 
recognition and fundamental rights. This article analyses the evolution 
of such interaction, and how fundamental rights can act as either limits 
or drivers of mutual recognition. It aims to show how individual rights 
and guarantees have limited automatic recognition and sheer effec-
tiveness, and, conversely, how the harmonisation of defence rights at 
the EU level can provide a basis for enhancing mutual trust and thus 
facilitating mutual recognition in criminal matters. In conclusion, it will 
be submitted that EU law can achieve effective judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters by moving from ‘blind’ to earned trust in Europe’s 
area of criminal justice.
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resumo: O modelo europeu de cooperação judiciária internacional 
em matéria penal, baseado em um elevado nível de confiança mútua 
presumida entre os Estados-Membros e no consequente princípio do 
reconhecimento mútuo, pretende ir além dos modelos tradicionais de 
cooperação, permitindo simplicidade e rapidez em uma perspectiva de 
“não se fazem perguntas”. O mandado de detenção europeu é emblemático 
dessa abordagem. No entanto, o funcionamento desse mecanismo não tem 
sido uma tarefa simples ou descomplicada, especialmente em relação à 
interação entre o reconhecimento mútuo e os direitos fundamentais. Este 
artigo analisa a evolução de tal interação e como os direitos fundamentais 
podem atuar como limites ou facilitadores do reconhecimento mútuo. 
Pretende-se demonstrar como os direitos e garantias individuais limitam 
o reconhecimento automático e a pura eficácia e, inversamente, como 
a harmonização dos direitos de defesa na UE pode fornecer uma base 
adequada para reforçar a confiança mútua e facilitar assim o reconhecimento 
mútuo em matéria penal. Em conclusão, será sustentado que a legislação 
da UE pode alcançar uma cooperação judiciária efetiva em matéria penal, 
passando de confiança “cega” para confiança conquistada no âmbito da 
justiça penal europeia.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: reconhecimento mútuo; mandado de detenção europeu; 
direito penal europeu; direitos fundamentais; harmonização; cooperação 
judiciária; confiança mútua.
1. IntroductIon
The application of the principle of mutual recognition in the 
field of European Union (EU) criminal law has provided the motor of 
European integration in criminal matters. The adoption of a series of 
mutual recognition measures have established a system of inter-state 
cooperation aimed at automaticity and a lack of formality, based on a 
high level of presumed mutual trust among the systems of the Member 
States. The EU model aims to go beyond traditional models of international 
cooperation in criminal matters, in enabling simplicity and speed on a 
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‘no questions asked’ approach.  Nonetheless, the operation of mutual 
recognition in EU criminal law, and in particular its emblematic Framework 
Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (FD-EAW), has demonstrated 
that presuming and claiming mutual trust in a field with a low level of EU-
wide harmonisation and with  significant consequences for fundamental 
rights has not been a straightforward or uncomplicated task. 
The aim of this article is to map the evolution of the EU model of 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters by casting light on the interplay 
between mutual recognition and fundamental rights, and by examining 
in particular the extent to which fundamental rights can act as limits 
or as facilitators to recognition. The article will begin by placing the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition – by focusing on the 
FD-EAW – within the context of the objective to achieve effectiveness 
in inter-state cooperation in criminal matters. It will then analyse how 
fundamental rights have emerged as a limit to automatic mutual recognition 
(both in secondary EU law and in the case-law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union - CJEU) and how harmonisation of defence rights 
can provide a basis for enhancing mutual trust and thus facilitating the 
operation of mutual recognition in criminal matters. In this manner, the 
article will assess the extent to which EU law can achieve effective judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters by moving from ‘blind’ to earned trust 
in Europe’s area of criminal justice.
2.  JudIcIal cooperatIon, mutual recognItIon and mutual 
trust In europe’s area of freedom, securIty and JustIce
In order to understand the relationship between mutual 
recognition and mutual trust in Europe’s area of criminal justice it is 
necessary to cast light on the very design of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (AFSJ) as such. While a key feature of the development 
of the AFSJ is the abolition of cross-border controls between Member 
States and the creation thus of a single European area where freedom 
of movement is secured, the latter is not accompanied by a single area 
of law. The law remains territorial, with Member States retaining to a 
great extent their sovereignty especially in the field of law enforcement. 
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A key challenge for European integration in the field has thus been 
how to make national legal systems interact in the borderless Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. Member States have thus far declined 
unification of law in Europe’s criminal justice area. The focus has largely 
been on the development of systems of cooperation between Member 
State authorities, with the aim of extending national enforcement 
capacity throughout the AFSJ in order to compensate for the abolition 
of internal border controls. 
The simplification of movement that the abolition of internal 
border controls entails has led under this compensatory logic to calls 
for a similar simplification in inter-state cooperation via automaticity 
and speed. Following this logic, the construction of the AFSJ as an area 
without internal frontiers intensifies and justifies automaticity in inter-
state cooperation.2 Automaticity in inter-state cooperation means that 
a national decision will be enforced beyond the territory of the issuing 
Member State by authorities in other EU Member States across the AFSJ 
without many questions being asked and with the requested authority 
having at its disposal extremely limited – if any at all – grounds to refuse the 
request for cooperation. The method chosen to secure such automaticity 
has been the application of the principle of mutual recognition in the 
fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
Mutual recognition is attractive to Member States resisting 
further harmonisation or unification in European criminal law as mutual 
recognition is thought to enhance inter-state cooperation in criminal 
matters without Member States having to change their national laws 
to comply with EU harmonisation requirements.3 Mutual recognition 
creates extraterritoriality4: in a borderless AFSJ, the will of an authority 
2 V. Mitsilegas, “The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Se-
curity and Justice. From Automatic Inter-state Cooperation to the Slow Emer-
gence of the Individual”, in Yearbook of European Law, vol. 31, 2012, p. 319-372.
3 V. Mitsilegas, “The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in 
Criminal Matters in the EU”, Common Market Law Review, vol. 43, 2006, p. 
1277-1311.
4 K. Nicolaidis and G. Shaffer, “Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: 
Governance without Global  Government”, Law and Contemporary Problems, 
vol. 68, 2005, p.263-317; K. Nicolaidis, “Trusting the Poles? Constructing 
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in one Member State can be enforced beyond its territorial legal borders 
and across this area. The acceptance of such extraterritoriality requires 
a high level of mutual trust between the authorities which take part 
in the system and is premised upon the acceptance that membership 
of the European Union means that all EU Member States are fully 
compliant with fundamental rights norms. It is the acceptance of the 
high level of integration among EU Member States which has justified 
automaticity in inter-state cooperation and has led to the adoption of a 
series of EU instruments which in this context go beyond pre-existing, 
traditional forms of cooperation set out under public international 
law, which have afforded a greater degree of scrutiny to requests for 
cooperation. Membership of the European Union presumes the full respect 
of fundamental rights by all Member States, which creates mutual trust 
which in turn forms the basis of automaticity in inter-state cooperation 
in Europe’s area of criminal justice.
Framed in this manner, mutual recognition has emerged as the 
motor of European integration in criminal matters under the third pillar. 
The adoption in 2001 by the Council of a detailed Programme of measures 
to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal 
matters5 has been followed by the adoption of a wide range of Framework 
Decisions putting forward a comprehensive system of mutual recognition in 
the field of criminal justice. These Framework Decisions have been adopted 
essentially in three stages, one shortly post-9/11, an intermediary stage 
consisting of the adoption of the Framework Decision on the European 
Evidence Warrant (now superseded by the post-Lisbon Directive on the 
European Investigation Order) and another in the years leading to the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.6 Their ambit covers all stages of the criminal 
process extending from the pre-trial (recognition of arrest warrants7, evidence 
Europe through Mutual Recognition”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 
14, 2007, p. 682-698.
5 OJ C 12/10, 15.01.2001.
6 V. Mitsilegas, “The Third Wave of Third Pillar Law: Which Direction for 
EU Criminal Justice?”, European Law Review, vol. 34, 2009, p. 523-560.
7 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the Europe-
an arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, OJ 
L 190/1, 18.07.2002.
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warrants8, freezing orders9, decisions on bail10) to the post-trial stage 
(recognition of confiscation orders11, of decisions on financial penalties12, 
of probation orders13 and of decisions on the transfer of sentenced 
persons14). The system of mutual recognition was completed in the pre-
Lisbon stage by a Framework Decision on judgments in absentia, which 
amended a number of the preceding Framework Decisions to specify 
cases when recognition of a judgment could or could not be refused15. 
8 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the 
European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, docu-
ments and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters, OJ L 350/72, 
30.12.2008. Post-Lisbon replaced by the Directive on the European Investi-
gation Order (see below).
9 Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execu-
tion in the European Union of orders freezing property or evidence, OJ L 
196/45, 02.08.2003.
10 Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the ap-
plication, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle of 
mutual recognition to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to 
provisional detention, OJ L 294/20, 11.11.2009.
11 Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the ap-
plication of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders, OJ L 
328/59, 24.11.2006.
12 Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the ap-
plication of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties, OJ L 
76/16, 22.3.2005.
13 Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and proba-
tion decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and al-
ternative sanctions, OJ L 337/102, 16.12.2008.
14 Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal 
matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of 
liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, OJ L 
327/27, 5.12.2008.
15 Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amend-
ing Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 
2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural 
rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual rec-
ognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the 
trial, OJ L 81/24, 27.3.2009.
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The main features of the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters are automaticity, speed, and the execution 
of judicial decisions with a minimum of formality16. Based on mutual 
trust, the system includes very limited grounds to refuse the recognition 
and execution of a judicial decision or to raise questions regarding the 
legal system of the Member State of the issuing authority17. Automaticity 
has presented a number of challenges, most notably with regard to the 
protection of the fundamental rights of affected individuals. These 
challenges have arisen in particular in the context of the FD-EAW, which 
is emblematic of the application of the principle of mutual recognition in 
the field of criminal law. It is the first measure to be adopted in the field 
and the main mutual recognition measure which has been implemented 
fully and in detail at the time of writing. Automaticity in the operation of 
inter-state cooperation under the FD-EAW has been introduced at three 
levels. Firstly, cooperation must take place within a limited timeframe, 
under strict deadlines, and on the basis of a pro-forma form annexed 
to the Framework Decision – this means that in practice few questions 
can be asked by the executing authority beyond what has been included 
in the form18. Secondly, the executing authority is not allowed to verify 
the existence of dual criminality for a list of 32 categories of offences 
listed in the Framework Decision19 – this means that the executing 
state is asked to deploy its law enforcement mechanism and arrest and 
surrender an individual for conduct which might not be an offence under 
its domestic law20. The third level of automaticity arises from the inclusion 
of limited grounds of refusal to recognise and execute a warrant under 
this instrument. The FD-EAW includes only three, in their majority 
procedural, mandatory grounds for refusal21, which are complemented 
16 V. Mitsilegas, fn. 2. 
17 V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law, Hart, 2009, chapter 3.
18 See Articles 15, 17 and 23 of the Framework Decision. The Court has con-
firmed the limited role of the executing authority in examining the content of 
the European Arrest Warrant in its ruling in Case C-261/09 Gaetano Mantello 
[2010] ECR I-11477.
19 Article 2(2).
20 See the Court’s ruling in Advocaten voor de Wereld below.
21 Article 3.
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by a series of optional grounds for refusal22 and provisions on guarantees 
underpinning the surrender process23. Non-compliance with fundamental 
rights is not however explicitly included as a ground to refuse to execute 
a European Arrest Warrant (EAW).24 This legislative choice reflects 
the view that cooperation can take place on the basis of a high level of 
mutual trust in the criminal justice systems of Member States, premised 
upon the presumption that fundamental rights are in principle respected 
fully across the European Union. However, as will be seen below, this 
uncritical acceptance of the existence of a high level of mutual trust has 
proven to be contested both in the implementation stage in EU Member 
States and subsequently in litigation before national and European courts.
3.  lImItIng automatIcIty: addressIng fundamental rIghts 
concerns In legIslatIon
The maximalist approach to mutual recognition adopted in 
the FD-EAW has led to reactions in European and national legislatures 
seeking ways of accommodating fundamental rights considerations 
within the operation of the EU system of mutual recognition25. There are 
three ways in which fundamental rights concerns have been addressed 
in legislation: via the use of parallel mutual recognition instruments to 
alleviate the adverse fundamental rights consequences of automaticity in 
the execution of mutual recognition requests; via the insertion of grounds 
for refusal on fundamental rights grounds in subsequent legislation; and 
via legislation addressing proportionality concerns. In terms of the use of 
22 Article 4.
23 Articles 5, 27 and 28.
24 The provision of Article 1(3) includes the general statement that ‘this Frame-
work Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect 
fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 
6 of the TEU’. References to fundamental rights are included also under a 
general wording in the Preamble to the Framework Decision (recital 12).
25 See V. Mitsilegas, “Mutual Recognition, Mutual Trust and Fundamental 
Rights After Lisbon” in V. Mitsilegas, M. Bergström and T. Konstadinides 
(eds.), Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law, Edward Elgar, 2016, p. 148-
168, whereupon this section is based.
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parallel mutual recognition measures, fundamental rights concerns can 
be addressed by the Framework Decision on the mutual recognition of 
bail decisions (the European Supervision Order), which would enable an 
individual surrendered under a EAW to spend the pre-trial period under 
bail conditions in the executing, and not the issuing, Member State26. In 
terms of the use of fundamental rights as a limit to mutual recognition, 
a number of Member States added non-compliance of surrender with 
fundamental rights as an express ground of refusal in their national law 
implementing the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision27. 
Moreover, the post-Lisbon Directive on the European Investigation Order 
(EIO)28 expressly includes non-compliance with fundamental rights as 
a ground for refusal to recognise and execute an EIO29. The Preamble 
to the same Directive affirms that the presumption of compliance by 
Member States with fundamental rights is rebuttable30. Similar provisions 
have been included in the recent Regulation on mutual recognition of 
freezing and confiscation orders31.
26 The use of the European Supervision Order as a means of addressing lengthy 
periods of pre-trial detention following the execution of a European Arrest 
Warrant was discussed and promoted in Sir Scott Baker, A Review of the Unit-
ed Kingdom’s Extradition Arrangements, presented to the Home Secretary on 
30 September 2011.
27 On the implementation of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant, see V. Mitsilegas, “The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
from Amsterdam to Lisbon: Challenges of Implementation, Constitution-
ality and Fundamental Rights”, in J. Laffranque (ed.) The Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, Including Information Society Issues (Reports of the 
XXV FIDE Congress, Tallinn 2012), vol. 3, p. 21-142 and national reports 
included therein.
28 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 
April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, 
OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, p. 1-36 .
29 Article 11(1)(f) states that the recognition or execution of an EIO may be 
refused ‘where there are substantial grounds to believe that the execution 
of the investigative measure indicated in the EIO would be incompatible 
with the executing State’s obligations in accordance with Article 6 TEU and 
the Charter’.
30 Preamble, recital 19.
31 Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 14 November 2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and con-
fiscation orders, OJ L303/1, 28.11.2018, Articles 8(1)(f) and 19(1)(f).
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The third way in which legislators have addressed fundamental 
rights concerns in the operation of mutual recognition has been via the 
insertion of proportionality check requirements in secondary law. The 
focus on proportionality has been triggered by concerns that the extensive 
scope of the FD-EAW combined with the abolition of the requirement 
to verify dual criminality has led to warrants being issued for offences 
considered minor or trivial in the executing state, resulting in considerable 
pressure to the criminal justice systems of executing Member States and 
disproportionate results for the requested individuals32. The need to 
address these proportionality concerns was acknowledged by the European 
Commission in its latest Report on the implementation of the Framework 
Decision33. The prevailing view has thus far being for proportionality to 
be dealt with in the issuing and not in the executing Member State. This 
is the interpretative guidance given in the revised version of the European 
Handbook on how to issue a European Arrest Warrant34. This approach 
has also been adopted by certain Member States in the implementation of 
EAW obligations35. The requirement to introduce a proportionality check 
in the issuing state has also been introduced at EU level in the Directive on 
the European Investigation Order, which states that the issuing authority 
may only issue an EIO where the issuing of the latter is necessary and 
proportionate and where the investigative measures indicated in the EIO 
could have been ordered under the same conditions in a similar domestic 
32 See Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Human Rights Implications of UK 
Extradition Policy, Fifteenth Report, session 2010-12, p. 40-3.
33 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 
on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member 
States COM(2011) 175 final, Brussels, 11.4.2011, p. 8.
34 For the latest version see Commission Notice - Handbook on how to issue and 
execute a European arrest warrant, OJ C 335/1, 6.10.2017, p. 14.
35 A number of changes to the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure came into 
force on July 1 2015. These include an amendment to Article 607b, which 
now states that an arrest warrant will not be issued if it is not required by 
the interest of the administration of justice. The reference to the interest of 
the administration of justice can be seen as amounting to an implicit propor-
tionality test. I am grateful to Celina Nowak for providing me the relevant 
information on Polish law.
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case36. The Directive thus links proportionality with the requirement to 
avoid abuse of law via the undertaking of “fishing expeditions” by the 
authorities of the issuing state. 
4.  the relatIonshIp between mutual recognItIon, mutual trust 
and fundamental rIghts before the european JudIcIary
In its early case-law, the CJEU demonstrated strong support for the 
system established by the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision37. The 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, bringing with it the communautarisation 
of the third pillar, the constitutionalisation of EU criminal law and of the 
Charter38, has raised hopes that the CJEU would modify its stance regarding 
fundamental rights scrutiny in the operation of the EAW. These hopes were 
increased by CJEU case-law in the field of mutual recognition in asylum law: 
in the case of NS and ME, the CJEU ruled that a transfer under the Dublin 
Regulation would be incompatible with fundamental rights ‘if there are 
substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum 
procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants in the Member State 
responsible, resulting in inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning 
of Article 4 of the Charter, of asylum seekers transferred to the territory of 
that Member State’39. The CJEU approach constituted a paradigmatic shift on 
mutual recognition based on automaticity: the Court stated expressly that the 
presumption of compliance with fundamental rights in the receiving Member 
State is rebuttable40 and it placed specific duties to sending authorities to 
examine fundamental rights compliance41.
36 Article 6(1)(a) and (b) respectively. A similar approach regarding necessity 
and proportionality has been adopted in the confiscation Regulation: see Ar-
ticle 1(3) of the Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 14 November 2018 on the mutual recognition of freezing 
orders and confiscation orders, OJ L 303, 28.11.2018, p. 1-38.
37 V. Mitsilegas, fn. 16, chapter 3.
38 V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law After Lisbon, Hart, 2016, chapter 5.
39 Case C-411/10, N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
EU:C:2011:865, para 85.
40 Ibid., para 104.
41 Ibid., para 94.
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It has been argued that the paradigm change to the operation 
of mutual trust in NS and ME also would be applicable in transfers of 
individuals under the EAW, establishing thus a horizontal benchmark 
of fundamental rights protection across the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice42. Yet in its first major post-Lisbon cases on the EAW, and 
notwithstanding also parallel developments in post-Lisbon EU criminal 
law43, the CJEU appeared reluctant to do so. In Radu44, and notwithstanding 
the attempt by AG Sharpston to bring the protection of fundamental rights 
into the fore (notably by advancing arguments based on proportionality)45 
the CJEU continued to focus on the effectiveness of the EAW. The Radu 
judgment was followed by Melloni46, where the CJEU found that Member 
States cannot refuse to execute a EAW on the basis of a level of fundamental 
rights protection provided under their national constitution which is 
higher than the level of protection provided in the Charter. By casting 
doubt on the uniformity of the standard of protection of fundamental 
rights as defined in the FD-EAW, Member States would undermine the 
principles of mutual trust and recognition which that decision purports to 
uphold and would, therefore, compromise the efficacy of that Framework 
Decision47. Melloni was followed by the questionable elevation of mutual 
trust to a fundamental principle of EU law in Opinion 2/13 concerning 
the accession of the EU to the ECHR48.
42 See V. Mitsilegas, fn. 1.
43 The post-Lisbon mutual recognition Directive on the European Investigation 
Order has introduced an optional ground for non-recognition or non-execu-
tion where there are substantial grounds to believe that the execution of the 
investigative measure indicated in the EIO would be incompatible with the 
executing State’s obligations in accordance with Article 6 TEU and the Char-
ter (Article 11(1)(f)).
44 Case C-396/11, Radu, EU:C:2013:39.
45 Radu, in particular para. 103.
46 Case C-399/11, Melloni, EU:C:2013:107.
47 Ibid., para 63.
48 Case Opinion 2/13 of the Court, Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paras. 191-192. For a critique, see V. Mitsilegas, 
“The Symbiotic Relationship between Mutual Trust and Fundamental Rights 
in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice”, New Journal of European Criminal Law, 
vol. 6, 2015, p. 460-485.
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The reasoning of the CJEU in both Melloni and Opinion 2/13 can 
be explained from a constitutional law perspective as the Court sending a 
clear message to the Strasbourg Court and to national constitutional courts 
of its determination to uphold the primacy and autonomy of EU law49. Yet 
the implications of the Court’s reasoning for a meaningful fundamental 
rights scrutiny in the process of mutual recognition are profound. The 
CJEU elevated the inherently subjective concept of mutual trust into a 
fundamental principle of EU law50 adopting a version of mutual trust 
which is to be taken at face value and to be presumed, with cracks in 
the façade of trust appearing only in exceptional cases. In defending the 
primacy and autonomy of EU law, the CJEU has thus however undermined 
the credibility of the EAW system in the eyes of national courts and the 
Strasbourg Court. The CJEU rulings appeared increasingly at odds with 
the Strasbourg approach centering on the individualised assessment of 
fundamental rights violations. This discrepancy was evident in the case of 
Tarakhel51, involving Dublin transfers from Switzerland to Italy, where the 
ECtHR found a breach of the Convention with regard to specific individuals 
even in a case where generalised systemic deficiencies in the receiving state 
had not been ascertained52. The CJEU approach vis-à-vis the protection of 
fundamental rights as enshrined in national constitutions has also raised 
alarm bells in national constitutional courts. These concerns have been 
expressed by the Bundesverfassungsericht in a ruling delivered in 2015, 
where it intervened regarding the scrutiny of fundamental rights in the 
execution of a EAW in a case of trial in absentia where the defendant’s 
49 See also the CJEU reiterating, in Opinion 2/13 (para. 188), the Melloni re-
quirement to uphold the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law.
50 V. Mitsilegas, fn. 47.
51 ECtHR, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 29217/12, Judgment of 4 Novem-
ber 2014.
52 Ibid., para 115, emphasis added. As Halberstam has noted, Tarakhel was a 
strong warning signal to Luxembourg that the CJEU’s standard better com-
port either in words or in practice with what Strasbourg demands or else 
the Dublin system violates the Convention. See D. Halberstam, “‘It’s the 
Autonomy, Stupid!’ A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to 
the ECHR, and the Way Forward”, Michigan Law School, Public Law and Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, vol. 432, 2015, p. 27.
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lawyer had not been notified53. The BVerfG found that mutual trust has 
its limits and ‘can be shaken’54, ‘if there are indications based on facts 
that the requirements indispensable for the protection of human dignity 
would not be complied with in the case of an extradition’55. The BVerfG 
focused on the principle of individual guilt, placed within the context of 
the protection of human dignity, which it asserted is beyond the reach 
of European integration’56, and found that it also applies to extraditions 
that take place on the basis of the EAW Framework Decision57.  In a 
landmark ruling, it introduced the requirement of identity review of 
measures implementing the EAW when the principle of human dignity 
is at stake. While the BVerfG ultimately found that the system established 
by EU law was not unconstitutional, it put forward a mechanism of 
scrutiny of fundamental rights concerns by the executing authority on 
an individualised basis58. Whereas the evocation of the identity review by 
the BVerfG has rightly been criticised59, the intervention by the German 
Constitutional Court has been of considerable significance in raising 
alarm bells in Luxembourg regarding the implications of continuing to 
uphold a version of presumed, uncritical, ‘blind trust’ for the credibility 
of the EAW system in the eyes of the authorities which are called upon 
to operate it and in the eyes of national constitutional courts.
The Court of Justice had the opportunity to examine directly the 
relationship between fundamental rights, mutual recognition and mutual 
trust in the joined cases of Aranyosi and Căldăraru60, both referred for a 
53 BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 15 December 2015 - 2 BvR 2735/14 - 
paras. (1-126).
54 Ibid., para 67.
55 Ibid., para 74. Also see para 83.
56 Ibid., para 76.
57 Ibid., para 72.
58 See paras. 63-72.
59 Meyer has noted that the emphasis on identity review did not fit the facts of 
the case, as EU secondary law was compliant with the German Constitution: 
F. Meyer, “‘From Solange II to Forever I’: The German Federal Constitutional 
Court and the European Arrest Warrant (and how the CJEU responded)”, 
New Journal of European Criminal Law, vol. 7, 2016, p. 277-294, at 283.
60 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăra-
ru, EU:C:2016:198.
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preliminary ruling by the Higher Regional Court of Bremen. The reference 
was another opportunity for the CJEU to address directly the question 
of whether the execution of an EAW could be refused on the grounds of 
concerns over the violation of fundamental rights. The cases involved both 
prosecution and conviction warrants issued by Romania and Hungary. 
Concerns by German authorities centered on the impact of execution 
on Article 4 of the Charter in view of the existence of pilot judgments 
by the European Court of Human Rights attesting breaches of Article 3 
ECHR on the grounds of the unacceptable state in prison conditions in 
both countries61. The German Court raised two broad questions at the 
heart of the discussion on defining the parameters of mutual trust: on 
the extent to which serious fundamental rights concerns could lead to 
the inadmissibility of a EAW and on the legal framework and content 
related to the provision of assurances by the issuing authorities asserting 
compliance with fundamental rights.
In a departure from earlier judgments, the CJEU proceeded to 
provide detailed guidelines to executing authorities on how they must 
proceed when assessing the existence of a risk of inhuman or degrading 
treatment arising from the execution of a EAW. The CJEU put forward 
a two-step approach. First, a general assessment of the risk must take 
place. Where the judicial authority of the executing Member State is in 
possession of evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment 
of individuals detained in the issuing Member State, it is bound to assess 
the existence of that risk when it is called upon to decide on the surrender 
to the authorities of the issuing Member State of the individual sought 
by a EAW62. To that end, the national court may rely on information that 
is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated on the detention 
conditions prevailing in the issuing Member State and that demonstrates 
that there are deficiencies, which may be systemic or generalised, or which 
may affect certain groups of people, or which may affect certain places of 
detention. Sources may include judgments of international courts, such 
as judgments of the ECtHR, judgments of courts of the issuing Member 
State, and also decisions, reports and other documents produced by 
61 Ibid., paras 43-44 and 60-61.
62 Ibid., para 88.
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bodies of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of the United Nations63. 
Domestic authorities are under a positive obligation to ensure that any 
prisoner is detained in conditions which guarantee respect for human 
dignity, that the way in which detention is enforced does not cause the 
individual concerned distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the 
unavoidable level of suffering that is inherent in detention and that, 
having regard to the practical requirements of imprisonment, the health 
and well-being of the prisoner are adequately protected64.
However, a finding by the executing judicial authority that 
there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment by virtue of 
general conditions of detention in the issuing Member State does not 
automatically signify that the execution of the EAW must be refused65. 
Therefore, in addition to a general assessment of the risk, it will also 
be necessary for the executing judicial authority as a second step to 
proceed to a further assessment, specific and precise, of whether there 
are substantial grounds to believe that the individual concerned will be 
exposed to that risk because of the conditions for his detention envisaged 
in the issuing Member State66. The executing authority is bound to 
determine whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, there 
are substantial grounds to believe that, following the surrender of that 
person to the issuing Member State, he will run a real risk of being subject 
in that Member State to inhuman or degrading treatment67. If on the 
basis of the information provided the executing judicial authority finds 
that there exists a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment for the 
individual in respect of whom the EAW was issued, then the execution 
is postponed, but it cannot be abandoned68. Until the point of obtaining 
supplementing information that would discount the existence of a risk 
of inhuman or degrading treatment, a decision on the surrender must be 
postponed, but if the existence of that risk cannot be discounted within 
63 Ibid., para 89.
64 Ibid., para 90.
65 Ibid., para 91.
66 Ibid., para 92.
67 Ibid., para 94.
68 Ibid., para 98.
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a reasonable time, the executing judicial authority must decide whether 
the surrender procedure should be brought to an end69.
Aranyosi is a landmark judgment and a turning point in the CJEU 
approach on mutual trust. It confirms a shift from automatic mutual 
recognition based on uncritical mutual trust (or, as the CJEU President 
Koen Lenaerts has put it ‘blind trust’70) to earned trust on the basis of 
an individualised assessment of the fundamental rights consequences of 
surrender on the ground71. Aranyosi is significant here in two respects: 
in departing from the CJEU mantra of ‘systemic deficiencies’ when 
confirming the requirement for the executing authority to examine 
the impact of the surrender on an individual basis; and in emphasising 
(as it has done in its case-law on asylum, and in particular in NS) the 
need for an assessment not only of the law, but also of the practice of 
fundamental rights protection as regards the individual concerned72. 
Aranyosi is significant in the CJEU setting detailed parameters for the 
co-operative relationship between national authorities responsible for 
operating the EAW. The CJEU has provided reasonably detailed guidance 
on the dialogue between authorities under Article 15 of the FD-EAW 
under a two-stage approach. In this context, the CJEU appears to have been 
inspired by the fundamental rights review approach adopted by the BVerfG, 
an approach that has been based, as with the BVerfG, on the recognition 
that the right in question is an absolute right linked to human dignity73. 
Although Aranyosi is not the outcome of a direct dialogue between the 
CJEU on the one hand and the BVerfG or the ECtHR on the other, its 
69 Ibid., para 104.
70 K. Lenaerts, “La Vie Après l’Avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (yet not 
Blind) Trust”, Common Market Law Review, vol. 54, 2017, p. 805-840, at 806. 
71 Writing on the need for earned trust before Aranyosi, see V. Mitsilegas, fn. 
37, chapter 5.
72 V. Mitsilegas, “Re-setting the Parameters of Mutual Trust: From Aranyosi to 
LM” in V. Mitsilegas, L. Mancano and A. di Martino (eds.), The Court of Jus-
tice and European Criminal Law. Leading Cases in a Contextual Analysis, Hart, 
2019, forthcoming.
73 See also Anagnostaras, “Mutual Confidence is Not Blind Trust! Fundamen-
tal Rights Protection and the Execution of the European Arrest Warrant: 
Aranyosi and Caldararu”, Common Market Law Review, vol. 53, 2016, p. 1675-
1704, at 1702.
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reasoning and outcome can be seen as a recognition by the CJEU of the 
approach taken by both these courts regarding mutual trust74. 
Aranyosi is also significant as it serves as a benchmark for the 
relations of EU Member States with third countries. In the case of 
Petruhhin75, – which involved an extradition request from Russia – the 
CJEU stated unequivocally that the mere existence of declarations and 
accession to international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental 
rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate 
protection where reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or 
tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to the principles 
of the ECHR76. The duties set out to judicial authorities by the CJEU in 
Aranyosi in internal EAW cases also apply, under certain circumstances, 
to requested authorities of EU Member States in extradition requests by 
third countries77. In setting up its judgment, the Court reiterated that in 
its relations with the wider world, the European Union is to uphold and 
promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its 
citizens, in accordance with Article 3(5) TEU78.
As a first step in a change of direction for the CJEU, Aranyosi leaves 
however a number of questions unanswered or creates further questions: 
is the adopted approach applicable only to cases involving challenges to 
Article 4 of the Charter, only to absolute rights, or to any fundamental 
right? What is the extent of the obligations of the authorities operating 
the EAW under the co-operative mechanism following Article 15 of the 
Framework Decision? In particular, what is the role of assurances in this 
co-operative paradigm? And what is the extent of these obligations if 
there are broader systemic concerns on the protection of fundamental 
rights in the Member State where the issuing authority is based, raising 
underlying rule of law issues? The CJEU has since had the opportunity 
74 K. Lenaerts, fn. 69, at 807. According to President Lenaerts, the contours of 
principle are not carved in stone, but will take concrete shape by means of a 
constructive dialogue between the ECJ, the ECtHR and national courts.
75 Case C 182/15, Petruhhin, ECLI:EU:C:2016:630.
76 Ibid., para 57.
77 Ibid., paras 58 and 59.
78 Ibid., para 44.
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to provide answers to some of these detailed questions – especially on 
the intensity of scrutiny and assurances – in the case of ML79. 
Moreover, and significantly, the CJEU has since dealt with the 
extension of fundamental rights grounds to limit automaticity and the 
link between fundamental rights and the rule of law. In its ruling in LM, 
also known as Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système 
judiciaire)80, the Court of Justice extended the two-stage Aranyosi test to 
cases where the rule of law is at stake, under the perspective of the right 
to a fair trial. In keeping with its case law, and notably with Opinion 
2/13, the Court first recalled that EU law is based on the fundamental 
premiss that the Member States share a set of common values, as stated 
in Article 2 TEU81. This implies and justifies the existence of mutual 
trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised82. 
Mutual trust underpins the principle of mutual recognition and they both 
are ‘of fundamental importance given that they allow an area without 
internal borders to be created and maintained’83. However, in exceptional 
circumstances, limitations may be placed on both these principles, as it 
is the case when the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading 
treatment is at stake (Article 4 of the Charter)84. The Court has now 
extended these limitations when the respect of Article 47 of the Charter, 
which enshrines the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, is 
jeopardised. The Luxembourg Court points out that judicial independence 
‘forms part of the essence of the fundamental right to a fair trial, a right 
which is of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which 
individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the values 
common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the 
value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded’85.  The Court then referred 
79 Case C-220/18 PPU, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft, ECLI:EU:C:2018:589.
80 Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système 
judiciaire), EU:C:2018:586.
81 Ibid., para. 35.
82 Ibidem.
83 Ibid., para. 36.
84 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru
85 Ibid., para. 48 (emphasis added).
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back to its judgment of February 2018 concerning the reduction in the 
remuneration of Portuguese judges, where it lingers over the notion of 
the rule of law86. In this ruling, the Court provided the first interpretation 
of Article 47 of the Charter and highlights that ‘the very existence of 
effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU law is of 
the essence of the rule of law’87. This requires the independence of courts 
and tribunals, which is essential to the proper working of the judicial 
cooperation system embodied by the preliminary ruling mechanism88. 
It is also essential, the Court added in LM, in the context of the EAW 
mechanism89. Recalling some previous judgments on the rationale behind 
the EAW Framework Decision, the Court concludes that the high level 
of trust between Member States underpinning the EAW mechanism is 
founded on the premiss that the criminal courts of the other Member 
States ‘meet the requirements of effective judicial protection, which 
include, in particular, the independence and impartiality of those courts’90. 
The Court’s ruling in LM is of far-reaching significance as it paves 
the way for rule of law scrutiny in Member States via the examination of 
the fundamental rights concerns underpinning the execution of a EAW. 
The dialogue between the Irish Court which referred the case and the 
CJEU constitutes a key example of bottom-up scrutiny of the rule of 
law across the European Union. This bottom-up scrutiny can go a long 
way in addressing the shortcomings of law and practice in relation to 
the operation of Article 7 TEU and the role and limits of EU institutions 
in scrutinizing effectively rule of law compliance in Member States91. 
National courts can escalate their concerns to the CJEU and invite the 
86 Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, EU:C:2018:117.
87 Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système 
judiciaire), para. 51, with reference to para. 36 of Case C-64/16, Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses.
88 Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système 
judiciaire), paras. 53-54, with reference to paras. 41-43 of Case C-64/16, As-
sociação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses.
89 Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système 
judiciaire), para. 55.
90 Ibid., para. 58.
91 V. Mitsilegas and S. Carrera, “Upholding the Rule of Law by Scrutinis-
ing Judicial Independence”, CEPS Commentary, (2018), <https://www.
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Court of Justice to make an assessment. This scrutiny is central for the 
credible and effective operation of the EAW system, involving cross-
border cooperation based on mutual trust. Rule of law scrutiny here 
occurs in a mechanism involving courts, rather than the executive. It is 
a mechanism which promotes dialogue and horizontal interactions, and 
which stresses the importance of rule of law compliance and scrutiny 
on the ground. The CJEU can act as the enabler of a dialogue between 
national authorities, providing avenues of communication and cooperation 
not only at the level of the highest courts, but importantly in the context 
of the operation of the EAW also at the level of lower courts. In terms 
of the scope of fundamental rights scrutiny, LM is of importance as it 
confirms that such scrutiny is not confined to Article 4 of the Charter 
but extends also to other rights (in the present case Article 47 rights) 
when linked to the operation of the rule of law. 
5.  harmonIsatIon of crImInal procedural law as a facIlItator 
of mutual recognItIon – the case of defence rIghts
A key question arising from a highly integrated model of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters based on mutual trust is the extent to 
which such a system can operate effectively and credibly without the 
establishment of a level-playing field in terms of procedural safeguards 
for the individuals concerned. The EU legislator has attempted to address 
mutual trust and fundamental rights challenges arising in the operation of 
mutual recognition by resorting to –at least minimum – harmonisation. 
Post-Lisbon, Article 82(2)(b) TFEU confers upon the European Union 
express competence to adopt minimum rules on the rights of individuals 
in criminal procedure. EU competence in the field is not self-standing, 
but functional: competence to adopt rules on procedural rights has been 
conferred to the EU only to the extent necessary to facilitate mutual 
recognition and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a 
cross-border dimension. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, six 
minimum standards Directives have been adopted under the Article 82(2)
ceps.eu/publications/upholding-rule-law-scrutinising-judicial-indepen-
dence-irish-courts-request-preliminary> (last visited 13 Sept. 2018).
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(b) TFEU legal basis covering the right to interpretation and translation92, 
the right to information93, the right of access to a lawyer94, legal aid95, 
procedural safeguards for children96 and the presumption of innocence 
and the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings97. The 
Commission has also released a Green Paper on the application of EU 
criminal justice legislation in the field of detention discussing the possibility 
to propose legislation on the matter based on Article 82(2) TFEU98. 
The adoption of these Directives has been justified on the grounds 
that they would serve to enhance mutual trust. The Preamble to the 
Directive on the right to interpretation and translation states for instance 
that ‘mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters can operate 
effectively in a spirit of trust in which not only judicial authorities but all 
actors in the criminal process consider decisions of the judicial authorities 
of other Member States as equivalent to their own, implying not only 
92 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal pro-
ceedings, OJ L 280, 26.10.2010, p. 1-7, at 1.
93 Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings, OJ L 142, 
1.6.2012, p. 1-10, at 1.
94 Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 October 2013 on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings 
and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right to have a third 
party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third 
persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, OJ L 294, 
6.11.2013, p. 1-12, at 1.
95 Directive (EU) 2016/1919 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 October 2016 on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal 
proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceed-
ings, OJ L 297, 4.11.2016, p. 1-8.
96 Directive (EU) 2016/800 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 May 2016 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or ac-
cused persons in criminal proceedings, OJ L 132, 21.5.2016, p. 1-20.
97 Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of 
innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings 
OJ L 65, 11.3.2016, p. 1–11.
98 Green Paper: Strengthening mutual trust in the European judicial area – A Green 
paper on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of deten-
tion, COM(2011) 327 final.
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trust in the adequacy of other Member States’ rules, but also trust that 
those rules are correctly applied’99. The same wording is used in the 
Preamble to the Directive on the right to information100, and the right to 
access to a lawyer101. While it may be difficult to establish a direct causal 
link between the minimum harmonisation of criminal procedural rules 
at EU level on the one hand and the enhancement of mutual trust in the 
operation of mutual recognition on the other102, the adoption of EU law 
in the field will certainly serve to enhance the protection of fundamental 
rights in Europe’s AFSJ and this may have an impact on the behaviour 
of the key actors – in particular judicial authorities – entrusted with the 
implementation and operation of mutual recognition. Although the stated 
aim of the Directives has been to establish minimum standards, they 
have introduced a series of binding norms on fundamental rights which 
have been interpreted by the Court of Justice thus far from a teleological 
perspective aiming to ensure the full effectiveness, including the effective 
exercise, of these rights103. 
There are three important parameters to the contribution of the 
EU measures on defence rights to the enhancement of the protection 
of fundamental rights and the reconfiguration of the relationship 
between authorities entrusted to implement the principle of mutual 
recognition. These parameters concern the level of protection envisaged 
by the EU instruments, the impact of the latter onto domestic legal 
orders, and the enhanced avenues of fundamental rights scrutiny 
99 Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in crim-
inal proceedings, cit., recital 4.
100 Ibidem.
101 Ibid., Preamble, recital 6. While earlier drafts of the Directive on access to 
a lawyer expanded the link between defence rights and trust by stating that 
common minimum rules ‘should increase confidence in the criminal justice 
systems of all Member States, which in turn should lead to more efficient 
judicial cooperation in a climate of mutual trust and to the promotion of a fun-
damental rights culture in the Union’ COM(2011) 326 final, recital 3, emphasis 
added. Council of the EU, 10467/12, 2011/0154 (COD).
102 For such a critique, see V. Mitsilegas, fn. 37, chapter 6.
103 Case C-216/14 Covaci, ECLI:EU:C:2015:686; Joined Cases C-124/16 Ianos 
Tranca, C-188/16 Tanja Reiter and C-213/16 Ionel Opria, ECLI:EU:C:2017:228; 
see also Opinion of AG Bot, Case C-216/4, Covaci, ECLI:EU:C:2015:305, pa-
ras. 32-33, 74.
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which the very existence of EU secondary law on fundamental rights 
entails. In terms of the level of protection: although the Directives 
introduce minimum standards and have been adopted to facilitate 
cross-border cooperation, they are applicable also to purely domestic 
situations104. Importantly, the Directives allow Member States the 
possibility of offering a higher level of protection under national law. 
This is enshrined in the text of the Directives via the introduction 
of non-regression clauses, affirming that nothing in the Directives 
must be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the rights 
and procedural safeguards that are ensured under the Charter, the 
ECHR, or other relevant provisions of international law or the law 
of any Member State which provides a higher level of protection105. 
The existence of non-regression clauses renders the applicability 
of the Melloni ruling in cross-border cases contested. Melloni requires 
national authorities not to expect other systems to offer similarly high 
standards of fundamental rights protection to their own domestic 
standards, as long as the standard of protection in the Member State 
of the issuing authority is compatible with the Charter. This applies in 
particular in cases where there has been harmonisation at EU level. As 
the Preamble to the access to a lawyer Directive states expressly, a higher 
level of protection by Member States should not constitute an obstacle 
to the mutual recognition of judicial decisions that those minimum 
104 See P. Caeiro, “Introdução / Introduction”, in Pedro Caeiro (org.), A Agenda 
da União Europeia sobre os Direitos e Garantias da Defesa em Processo Penal: a 
“segunda vaga” e o seu previsível impacto sobre o direito português / The Europe-
an Union Agenda on Procedural Safeguards for Suspects or Accused Persons: the 
“second wave” and its predictable impact on Portuguese law, Instituto Jurídico, 
2015 (available at: <https://ij.fd.uc.pt/publicacoes/comentarios/ebook_1_
comentarios.pdf>), p. 8 f. (English version at p. 13 f.). 
105 Directive on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceed-
ings, art. 8; Directive on the right to information in criminal proceedings, art. 
10; Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings, art. 
14; Directive on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal pro-
ceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceeding, 
art. 11; Directive on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or 
accused persons in criminal proceedings, art. 23; Directive on the strength-
ening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to 
be present at the trial in criminal proceedings, art. 13. 
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rules are designed to facilitate106. However, it is questionable whether 
minimum harmonisation in the field of procedural rights, coupled with 
non-regression clauses, is sufficient to justify such an approach. In terms 
of the interaction of national authorities trying to establish mutual trust, 
it may be a challenge to accept lower standards in fundamental rights 
in another Member State when EU law provides only for minimum 
harmonisation (which can constitute the lowest common denominator for 
protection at times) and leaves considerable margin of discretion for the 
adoption of higher standards by Member States. This is particularly the 
case as in this kind of legislation law in the books is inextricably linked 
with law in action, with effective protection being dependent on how 
the provisions of the Directives are actually implemented on the ground. 
Having said that, the adoption of EU legislation in the field of 
procedural rights opens up two further avenues which will serve to 
enhance substantially the level of protection of fundamental rights. The 
second parameter in terms of providing a high level of protection involves 
the far-reaching impact of EU law on domestic legal systems. A number of 
key provisions conferring rights in the Directives have direct effect. In a 
system of decentralised enforcement of EU law, individuals can evoke and 
claim rights directly before their national courts if the EU Directives have 
not been implemented or have been inadequately implemented. Direct 
effect means in practice that a suspect or accused person can derive a 
number of key rights – such as the right to an interpreter or the right to 
access to a lawyer – directly from EU law if national legislation has not 
made appropriate provision in conformity with EU law107. 
These mechanisms of decentralised enforcement of secondary 
EU law which is essentially fundamental rights law are coupled with the 
third parameter of protection, namely the proliferation of avenues and 
means of scrutiny of implementation and operation of these measures on 
the ground. Post-Lisbon, the Commission has full powers to monitor the 
implementation of these Directives by Member States and has the power 
106 Preamble of the Directive on the right of access to a lawyer, cit., recital 54.
107 The Spanish Constitutional Court has confirmed that provisions of the Direc-
tive on the right to information entail direct effect: see STC 13/2017, of 30 
January 2017.
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to introduce infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice when 
it considers that the Directives have not been implemented adequately. 
The scope of the Commission’s scrutiny is broader than to check merely 
the provision of national legislation adopted to implement specifically 
the EU Directives in question. The Commission is also under the duty 
to scrutinise national systems more broadly to ensure that effective 
implementation has taken place, as well as to ensure that rights are applied 
fully in practice. It must be noted in this context that the procedural 
standards set out in the Directives will have an impact on a wide range 
of acts under national criminal procedure108, which, under the CJEU 
approach in Fransson109, will fall within Charter scrutiny although they 
do not necessarily implement a specific Directive provision. This view 
is reinforced by the Court’s finding in Siragusa that it is important to 
consider the objective of protecting fundamental rights in EU law, which 
is to ensure that those rights are not infringed in areas of EU activity, 
whether through action at EU level or through the implementation of 
EU law by the Member States110. 
This approach extends to the Commission’s scrutiny of the 
implementation of mutual recognition measures such as the EAW. In view 
of persistent fundamental rights concerns raised at national level, such 
scrutiny must include prison and detention conditions and trial and pre-
trial procedures, although the EU has not legislated specifically on these 
matters. The adoption of EU measures on procedural rights is significant 
in this context as it creates a continuum and a functional link between 
fundamental rights legislation and enforcement legislation in the European 
public order. It can be seen as a first step towards further convergence, 
either by further legislation leading to higher-level harmonisation, or at 
the level of the interpretation by the CJEU, by developing fundamental 
rights protections and an interpretative level-playing field via the definition 
of autonomous concepts.111
108 See Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-216/4, Covaci, EU:C:2015:305, in particular 
paras 105-106.
109 Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105.
110 Case C-206/13, Cruciano Siragusa, EU:C:2014:126, para 31.
111 On the role of autonomous concepts in managing diversity in Europe’s 
area of criminal justice see V. Mitsilegas, “Managing Legal Diversity in 
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6.  conclusIon: from ‘blInd’ to earned trust In europe’s area 
of crImInal JustIce
This article has demonstrated the evolution of the place of 
fundamental rights in the operation of the principle of mutual recognition 
in EU criminal law. The initial approach of the EU legislator – exemplified in 
the adoption of the FD-EAW – which promoted automaticity in recognition 
based on ‘blind trust’ with limited space for fundamental rights scrutiny of 
the execution of mutual recognition requests has been met with resistance 
by national legislators and courts. This has led to the slow evolution of 
the case-law of the CJEU, which following direct and indirect dialogue 
with national courts has finally adopted a decisive move from ‘blind’ to 
earned trust in its ruling in Aranyosi, which introduced a mechanism for a 
meaningful scrutiny of the fundamental rights implications of a surrender 
for the individual concerned. Aranyosi has also been applied to extradition 
requests by third countries, and, significantly, its application has not been 
limited to Article 3 ECHR/Article 4 Charter cases but has been extended 
to judicial protection rights linked to the rule of law. At the same time, 
the EU legislators have made ample use of the opportunities offered by 
the Lisbon Treaty to ‘legislate for human rights’112 under Article 82(2) 
TFEU and to adopt a series of Directives covering a number of rights 
of the individual in criminal proceedings. Although these Directives 
claim to introduce minimum standards only, their impact on enhancing 
fundamental rights protection in Europe’s area of criminal justice is 
significant: they apply not only to cross-border, but also to domestic 
situations; the need for their effectiveness has been underpinned by the 
CJEU; and a number of their key provisions have direct effect. Importantly, 
and similarly with the CJEU approach in Aranyosi, the adoption by the 
EU of measures on defence rights and the requirement to ensure their 
Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice: The Role of Autonomous Concepts” in 
R. Colson and S. Field (eds.), EU Criminal Justice and the Challenges of Legal 
Diversity. Towards A Socio-Legal Approach to EU Criminal Policy, CUP, 2016, 
p. 125-160.
112 V. Mitsilegas, “Legislating for Human Rights After Lisbon: The Transfor-
mative Effect of EU Measures on Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings”, 
in M. Fletcher, E. Herlin-Karnell and C. Matera (eds.), The European Union as 
an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Routledge, 2017, p. 201-215.
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effective implementation opens the door to extensive scrutiny of national 
criminal justice systems on the ground and in a holistic way. 
Ensuring effective and real compliance with fundamental rights 
leads to a transformation of the operation of the principle of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters, on the basis of a shift from blind to 
earned trust in Europe’s area of criminal justice. In this manner, via the 
opening of avenues of dialogue between national courts operating the 
system of mutual recognition, but also of avenues of dialogue between 
national courts and the CJEU and avenues of communication between 
national authorities, EU institutions and civil society, the European Union 
may be closer to achieving an effective and credible system of judicial 
cooperation legitimised via the effective, on the ground, protection of 
fundamental rights.
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